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1 
Abstract 
This thesis is composed of two primary parts, each involving discussion of Catholicism and 
political life. Part I critiques Thomas Aquinas’ theory of government in light of his theory of 
nature, with an emphasis on original sin as a defining attribute of the human person. The section 
concludes with an argument in favor of democracy rooted in Aquinas’s theory of human nature, 
as well as an understanding of the role of the Catholic Church in light of the claims made in this 
part of the thesis. Part II contains a political science study assessing factors that contribute to 
party identification among American Catholics. Pew Forum’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study 
provides a foundation with which to test theories of Catholic partisanship rooted in religiosity 
and practice, religious belief, political ideology, and demographic change. After reviewing the 
data, it appears that Mass attendance, traditionalism, departure from Catholic orthodoxy, political 
attitudes, and several demographic categories are accurate predictors of party identification, 
while other measures tested are less effective predictors. Though some religious variables appear 
to have an impact on identification, non-religious factors seem to have a larger effect. A short 
conclusion ties the two parts together, making normative claims about the practice of Catholic 
faith in the public sphere.   
2 
Introduction 
Few disciplines are as integrally linked as theology and politics. One looks for meaning 
in the world, typically gathering answers to the “why?” and “what?” questions life presents. The 
other seeks answers to the “how?” questions, searching for ways in which to act upon discovered 
truth and to make sense of the realm of human interaction. Each strives in its own way to make 
sense of the human experience and to find ways in which the human community can be 
developed and improved.  
From the perspective of Catholic teaching, humanity—as individuals and as a worldwide 
community—is created for both earthly and heavenly ends of love and lasting happiness, but 
clearly, we do not always reach these ends. In a world where war and conflict seem to be the 
norm, where so many are faced with systemic injustice, and where so many are denied what is 
rightly due to them, it ought to be clear to all that sin and misery are abundantly present in the 
world today, now over two thousand years since Jesus preached repentance and belief in the 
Gospel. As far as political institutions are concerned, a substantial percentage of the world’s 
population lives in relative lack of freedom. According to Michael J. Abramowitz, President of 
Freedom House, world ratings of political rights and civil liberties in 2018 are at their lowest in 
over a decade, and for the twelfth year in a row, more countries are sliding toward 
authoritarianism than climbing out of it.1 
This visible injustice requires a reckoning with the very foundation of what makes us 
human. What does it mean to be created in the “image of God,” when human beings globally are 
subjected to horrible wrongs at the hands of their brothers and sisters? Not only do we see this 
 
1 "Democracy in Crisis," Freedom House, 2018  accessed July 4, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2018. 
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wrongness in the world around us, but we can feel it within our own selves. Whether it lies in 
some nasty vice or bad habit, or simply a failure to refrain from eating too many cookies when 
we know we shouldn’t, we realize our own inability to live up to the standards we set and expect 
from ourselves. The Apostle Paul shares his own relatable struggles, writing “For I do not do the 
good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do.”2  
In this undergraduate capstone project, I wanted to engage both my academic disciplines 
in a single project, allowing me to explore the overlap between political science and theology 
while grappling with such biting questions as these. With this two-pronged thesis, I look to 
present Catholicism in political practice from two differing perspectives—one from a Catholic 
theology of political life, the other from a political study of American Catholicism. By taking 
this approach, I hope to combine methodologies from both disciplines, making both positive 
statements and normative judgments about our world today and the role of the Catholic in the 
global struggle. In Part I, I attempt to use a theological anthropology of original sin and the Fall, 
rooted in the writings of Aquinas, to contrast what is to what ought to have been, to compare the 
brokenness and imperfection of our world today to the exceptional state of grace we might have 
been born into, and to follow the direct relationship between this change in human nature and its 
consequences for human government. In Part II, I examine government in practice, as American 
Catholics wrestle with an electoral system in which no viable option is in complete conformance 
with the values they hold dear. I end with a brief testament to the value of hope and our call to be 
a bit of light in a world shrouded by darkness. Though I recognize that I cannot solve the real 
problems the world faces simply by writing this draft, I hope that someday I—and all of us as 
humans—can find both an earthly and heavenly peace, free from the terrors of sin and injustice.   
 
2 Rom. 7:19, NRSV.  
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Part I: Politics as Seen through the Fall 
James Madison writes in Federalist Paper No. 51, " But what is government itself, but 
the greatest of all reflections on human nature?”3 The recognition by Madison of the link 
between human nature and government provides an excellent starting point for this discussion of 
Catholicism and politics. The Catholic tradition has a wealth of teaching about human nature 
from which to draw upon, and premier among these authorities is Thomas Aquinas. Central to 
the Catholic narrative of humankind is the duality of sin and redemption, from the entrance of sin 
into the world through the Fall of humanity to the restoration of grace through the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Because of the gift of free will, coupled with the effects of original 
sin after the Fall, individuals and humanity as a whole not only have a capacity for sin but a 
propensity toward it, creating a fog over humanity’s true purpose in unity with the Divine.  
The lens of the human condition both before and after the Fall in relation to original sin 
provides significant insight into our understanding of political institutions and the way we as 
humans participate in them. Because of the parallel relationship between human nature and 
government, it becomes inevitable that in original sin humanity’s imperfection is transferred to 
the political institutions it creates, which are twisted shadows of what could have been otherwise. 
In his writing, Aquinas creates an excellent depiction of prelapsarian humanity as created in the 
image a likeness of God, made for community with God and one another. However, after the 
Fall, the universal community of humankind is united not only as created in the image and 
likeness of God, but in the curse of original sin. Relationship between humans and God, and 
among humans, is possible but is in no way guaranteed. Though Aquinas adjusts his theological 
 
33 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist Papers (Project Gutenberg, 1991), 
264, https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18. 
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anthropology to reflect fallen nature, his political writing does not adequately consider humanity 
in this way, particularly in his persisting endorsement of monarchy. In this paper, I argue that 
although much of Aquinas’s attitude towards the purpose and nature of government remains 
quite relevant and contains valuable insight, his theory of government must be adjusted further to 
account for the tension between human nature as created good in the image and likeness of God 
and as flawed through original sin. In response, rather than monarchy, democracy is the highest 
form of government to which humans can aspire, recognizing that even this may be a struggle.  
The Human Condition before the Fall 
In his Summa, Aquinas has much to say about the origin of humankind, stemming both 
from Genesis and from his theory of humanity inherited from Aristotle. Today, the narratives of 
Creation and Adam and Eve in Paradise in Genesis 1–3 are often overlooked as historical 
inaccuracy due to theories of evolution or simply caricaturized as “God made man and woman, 
they sinned, end of story,” Aquinas himself is also time-conditioned in a different sense: he is a 
strict literalist regarding these passages, his biology is inaccurate when compared to modern 
science, and his view of women is far less than appropriate for the modern reader. However, this 
does not render his anthropology completely invalid. Aquinas addresses the persons of Adam 
and Eve quite specifically in his Treatise on Man, but his writing on prelapsarian humans in 
general and their offspring as well as specific concepts throughout his writing provide a valuable 
and useful interpretation of human nature before the Fall in light of a non-literal reading of the 
first chapters of Genesis.4 
 
4 The discussion surrounding creationism and theistic evolutionism and biological polygenism and 
theological monergism is an interesting one, and one I do not particularly desire to get involved in here. The Church 
is quite clear in its insistence on theological monergism (cf. Humani Generis), and I as a Catholic consent to the 
authority of the Church in spiritual matters such as this. However, faith and reason (think science) cannot be 
opposite, even on an issue like this one. Pope Benedict XVI said the following, particularly beautiful collection of 
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Among the greatest observations one can make from these sources is a portrait of human 
nature, which Aquinas does well in his Summa. On the most fundamental level, all humans are 
made in the image and likeness of God.5 While all creation bears the likeness of God for the fact 
that it exists, and living things because they are alive, humanity alone has the capacity for 
understanding and the recognition of the divine, and this is the essence of the image of God.6 
Pope Benedict XVI echoes this point, saying, “Human beings…are profoundly human when they 
step out of themselves and become capable of addressing God on familiar terms…they are the 
beings that God made capable of thinking and praying. They are most profoundly themselves 
when they discover their relation to their Creator.”7 
For Aquinas, in seeking God, humans are seeking their own fulfillment and their own 
true happiness. As Augustine so poignantly and famously writes in the first chapter of 
Confessions, “You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for 
yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”8 As God as Trinity is relational, humans 
 
words and it remains reasonably close to my own view of our origins: 
 
“The clay became man at the moment in which a being for the first time was capable of forming, however 
dimly, the thought of “God.” The first Thou that—however stammeringly—was said by human lips to God marks 
the moment in which the spirit arose in the world. Here the Rubicon of anthropogenesis was crossed. For it is not the 
use of weapons or fire, not new methods of cruelty or of useful activity, that constitute man, but rather his ability to 
be immediately in relation to God. This holds fast to the doctrine of the special creation of man…herein…lies the 
reason why the moment of anthropogenesis cannot possibly be determined by paleontology: anthropogenesis is the 
rise of the spirit, which cannot be excavated with a shovel. The theory of evolution does not invalidate the faith, nor 
does it corroborate it. But it does challenge the faith to understand itself more profoundly and thus to help man to 
understand himself and to become increasingly what he is: the being who is supposed to say Thou to God in 
eternity.” Benedict XVI et al., Creation and Evolution: A Conference with Pope Benedict XVI in Castel Gandolfo 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 15–16. 
5 Cf. Gen. 1:26.  
6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.93.2.  
7 Joseph Ratzinger, "In the Beginning...":A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall, 
Ressourcement, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1995), 47–48. 
8 Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008  ), 3. 
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as created in the image of God are oriented toward the same kind of relationship with God, in 
which humans find true happiness. Aquinas writes, “It is impossible for any created good to 
constitute man’s happiness…Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the 
universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone.”9 For Aquinas, 
relationship with God is to know God intimately, as he writes that “final and perfect happiness 
can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence.”10 
Unfortunately, this perfect happiness cannot be found in this life as God is not fully 
attainable during this life. However, humans can still reach what Aquinas calls “imperfect 
happiness.” In striving to reach communion with God, humans can attain earthly happiness by 
seeking loving relationship with fellow humans as an integral part of love of God. Regarding the 
value of friendship, Aquinas writes,  
If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the 
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices 
himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation 
of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to 
them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be 
helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in 
the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the 
fellowship of friends.11  
 
9 ST 1-2.2.8.  
10 ST 1-2.3.8. 
11 ST 1-2.4.8 
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Jesus remarks in the Gospel of Matthew that “where two or three or gathered together in my 
name, there am I in the midst of them.”12 In saying this, Jesus demonstrates the holiness of 
human relationship when love of neighbor stems from love of God.  
To aid in development of relationship, both with God and other people, humans are 
created with the capacity for virtue. Thomas Aquinas notes the traditional definition of virtue as 
“a good quality of the mind that enables us to live in an upright way and cannot be employed 
badly.”13 Virtues, then, are that which help humans to properly orient themselves towards God 
and neighbor, and are thus essential to the vision of happiness which Aquinas outlines. For 
Aquinas, virtues sort themselves into three primary categories: intellectual, which perfect the 
reason; theological, which concern the human person’s relationship with God; and cardinal, 
which concern the human person’s relationship with self and other. The intellectual virtues are 
separated into two categories. Among the speculative virtues, which “perfect the speculative 
intellect for the consideration of truth,” are included understanding (knowledge of first 
principles), science (deductive knowledge), and wisdom (knowledge of the highest causes).14 
The practical intellectual virtues concern the application of truth and include art, “the right 
reason about works to be made,”15 and prudence, “the right reason of things to be done.”16 
Most important for the purposes of this paper are the theological and cardinal virtues. The 
three primary theological virtue—faith, hope, and charity—concern the human’s relationship to 
 
12 Mat. 18:20, NABRE. 
13 ST 1-2.55.4.  
14 ST 1-2.57.2.  
15 ST 1-2.57.3. 
16 ST 1-2.57.4. 
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God. Aquinas writes, “First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, 
which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. 
Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as something attainable—and this 
pertains to hope—and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, 
transformed into that end—and this belongs to charity.”17 These are not brought about by human 
effort but are infused within the human by grace. On the other hand, cardinal virtues—prudence, 
justice, fortitude, and temperance—look toward earthly happiness in relationship with self and 
other. Prudence is the perfection of the moral reason, justice of the will, and fortitude and 
temperance of the appetites.18 These virtues are attainable without grace, but with the assistance 
of grace, they become infused cardinal virtues, enabling people to live well on earth in view of 
their final destiny with God.19  
These virtues and their connection to relationship will become the framework with which 
to examine the separation between the conditions of pre- and postlapsarian humanities. While 
humans before and after the Fall share the same essential nature as described above, what 
primarily distinguishes the former is the supernatural state in which the first humans were 
created: original justice. This condition was essentially a supernatural subjection of the body to 
the soul, and the soul to the will of God.20 Importantly, original justice was characterized by 
fullness of relationship, both between God and humanity and among humans, made possible by 
grace. As Ryan writes, “Man became a friend of God, a member of God’s household, an adopted 
 
17 ST 1-2.62.3. 
18 ST 1-2.61.2.  
19 ST 1-2.63.3.  
20 ST 1-2.81.5; ST 1-2.82.3.  
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child of God, a partaker of the Divine Nature, an heir of God, a coheir with Christ, and qualified 
for the Beatific Vision; that is, destined to ‘see God face to face.’”21 This relationship between 
humanity and God is demonstrated in the first chapters of Genesis.22 Friendship between God 
and the first people was one of transparency and accordance with nature. The first people were 
able to see and communicate with God clearly and were placed in the garden as co-creators with 
God, but did not regard themselves as equals to God. Through the grace of original justice God 
elevated human nature in order that humans might be able to more fully experience relationship 
with God. 
In exploring this condition in which humanity lived before the Fall, one must focus on 
exactly those things which comprise it: supernatural and preternatural gifts. Both are favors 
from God through grace, but they differ in their interaction with human nature. Supernatural gifts 
are entirely of another (divine) nature, while preternatural gifts work to bring human nature 
beyond what it is normally capable of. Together, these constitute materially the state of original 
justice.  
The primary supernatural gift given to the first humans —and the gift through which all 
others were possible—is the gift of sanctifying grace, which brought them into an otherwise 
impossible friendship with God and one another. Grace as a supernatural gift raises up humanity 
from natural creature to one capable of participation in life with God.23 Though relationship with 
God was made more possible in this life in original justice, it would be still more possible in 
perpetuity at the end of time. Sanctifying grace enabled the first humans to share an eternity with 
 
21 John A. Ryan, Original Sin and Human Misery (New York: Paulist Press, 1942), 11–12. 
22 Cf. Gen. 2.  
23 ST 1-2.110.4.  
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God, able to witness God’s glory to a degree much greater even than would be visible in original 
justice, though the latter state would greatly enhance the ability of humans to cooperate with this 
grace while on Earth.  
In original justice, by virtue of their condition through the power of grace, humans would 
necessarily have possessed the gift of infused virtue. As theological virtues are always infused 
through grace, the state of grace in which the first humans lived allowed for perfection of these 
virtues within them, leading them deeper in relationship with God in search of divine happiness. 
In original justice, charity was perfect as far as friendship with God could be perfected in this 
state. God was the source of true, life-giving happiness and the first humans responded 
accordingly with love. Faith and hope were still necessary for the first humans because even they 
had not seen God “in his essence,” though they had certainly seen God more fully and likely had 
more direct knowledge of God than fallen humanity.24 In sum, there were not yet barriers 
between God and humans, and grace made humans more fully capable of experiencing God.  
God also gave the first humans perfection of cardinal virtue through the preternatural 
gifts, helping them to attain earthly happiness and live in relationship with one another. As 
cardinal virtues are nothing more than the rightness of the parts of the soul, possession of these 
virtues at least to a degree is necessary to original justice, which is foremost the rightness of the 
human person.25 First, in the fullness of prudence and justice, prelapsarian humanity received 
freedom from ignorance, at least as it pertains to the moral law. For Aquinas, this is not so much 
an externally-sourced gift of knowledge as it is the capacity for full awareness of the natural law, 
 
24 ST 2-2.5.1.  
25 ST 1.95.3.  
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which is "the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature.”26 Even children, who 
would not yet have perfect reason by virtue of their nature as children, “would have had 
sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by 
universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete 
than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.”27 If 
original justice is the perfection of humanity’s communion with God and neighbor, then humans, 
to whom it is essential to have the capacity for knowledge of the good, in original justice at the 
very least ought to have the moral knowledge to live in that perfect community. 
 As far as the human person through reason has access to moral truth and the essential 
purpose of the human in communion with God, she has the virtue of prudence. Of course, 
prudence and the acquisition of knowledge require access to reason, which is why Aquinas 
argues that prelapsarian humans would have perfect reason, and within that the accompanying 
intellectual virtues as they relate to the acquisition of knowledge not inherently held.28 Even if 
the prelapsarian human would not have inherent knowledge of science or art and may be 
unaware of this truth, he could not be deceived regarding it and could quickly learn. Aquinas 
writes, “Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the 
Philosopher says. So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the 
human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth.”29  
 
26 ST 1-2.91.2.  
27 ST 1.101.1. 
28 ST 1.101.1; 1.101.2.  
29 ST 1.94.4.  
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Granting the fullness of fortitude and temperance (and justice in relation to these), the 
second preternatural gift was the gift of integrity, or freedom from concupiscence (which is 
defined as an inclination to sin30). In the state of original justice, “not only were the lower 
powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but 
also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul.”31 The lower powers Aquinas 
refers to in this passage are, more specifically, the concupiscible and irascible appetites; lower 
because they are shared with animals and lesser than the reason and will. The concupiscible 
appetite is that which seeks what is sensually desirable, while the irascible is the appetite that 
“risks these attacks that hinder what is suitable.” These lower powers of the first humans were 
entirely subject to reason, forming a unity between body and soul with each in its proper place. 
While desire for earthly goods is natural to humans and inherent to the search for earthly 
happiness, humans are best able to attain earthly happiness when these passions and desires are 
moderated by the virtues of fortitude and temperance. For example, a person in the condition of 
original justice would not desire more or less food, drink, or exercise then would be conducive to 
human flourishing. Human freedom is best executed in the absence of vice or harmful impulse, 
and both would have been held in check by the gift of integrity.  
The picture of humanity that Aquinas gives is one that gives glory to God by showing the 
good in God’s most beloved creation. As humans are made in the image and likeness of God, 
with the ability to recognize God as God, the state of original justice allowed our first parents to 
radiate the joy of creation as such most fully through relationship with God and with one 
another. Prelapsarian humanity would have had a complete unity of body and soul—a perfect 
 
30 CCC 405.  
31 ST 1-2.85.5.  
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order within the self, and a perfect fixation on God as the true source of life. Humanity has 
always been called by God to relationship, but through grace this relationship was made as 
perfect as humanly possible.  
Political Community before the Fall 
Madison continues his reflection on government and human nature by saying, “If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary.”32 In the state of original justice, human nature 
is exactly that as Madison refers to as angelic—perfectly virtuous, particularly as relates to 
community. The question is, then, what is the role of government if humans are as perfect as 
humanly possible? Would government have existed if humanity had remained in the state of 
original justice, and if so, what would it have looked like? Aquinas disagrees with Madison in 
insisting that government would have existed in the state of original justice. If government is 
understood as a means for a people to make binding decisions for itself, it would have existed in 
original justice, and the form that it would take in this state would reflect the perfected nature of 
its members. In taking this position, Aquinas sets the foundation for a positive general 
assessment of political engagement which is directed toward the common good. Of course, any 
remarks on pre-Fall government are decidedly speculative—and surely Aquinas realizes this as 
well—but in taking up this issue within the limits of the state of original justice as Aquinas 
describes, the prelapsarian nature of humanity gives insight to what might have been the 
perfection of political community. 
Aquinas believes that it is essential to human nature to desire community, as community 
is integral to the human experience, and government is essential to community life. Included in 
 
32 Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, The Federalist Papers, 264. 
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the natural desire for happiness is an inclination towards life with others. The classical thinkers 
seem to agree on this point. Aristotle remarks that “man is by nature a political animal.”33 
Augustine asserts that there is no creature more naturally social than the human person.34 
Aquinas writes in his Summa that “there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature 
of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth 
about God, and to live in society.”35 Scripture aligns on this point as well. In one of the more 
commonly used references, God remarks in Genesis, “It is not good that the man should be 
alone.”36 If there is a natural inclination to good within humankind, and that natural inclination 
points towards life in community, then community life must be a good worth participating in.  
Even in a single family, the smallest and most foundational unit of society, parents must 
make decisions for themselves and for their children. If a need to make authoritative decisions 
exists in a community as small as this, then certainly there is a need for decision on a larger scale 
as well. While some create a separation between social life and political life, Aquinas takes the 
opposite approach, saying that political life contributes to a positive social life. Participation in 
social governance is not something extraneous to human flourishing, but something integral to it. 
This is through the promotion of the common good, which he sees as the true purpose of 
government and the primary reason for its presence in prelapsarian society. Government 
promotes the common good in managing the individual goods of its constituents and promoting 
the development of virtue. Aquinas writes, “For where there are many men together and each 
 
33 Aristotle, Politics, 1.2.  
34 Augustine, The City of God, 12.28. 
35 ST 1-2.94.2. 
36 Gen. 2:18, RSVCE.  
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one is looking after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there 
were also an agency to take care of what appertains to the commonweal. In like manner, the 
body of a man or any other animal would disintegrate unless there were a general ruling force 
within the body which watches over the common good of all members.”37 In order that 
community might truly benefit the common good, the community must be able to make 
decisions for itself that are oriented towards that good, particularly in mediating between the 
desires of individuals seeking their own goods—not selfishly, necessarily—and properly 
aligning the wills of these individuals towards their neighbors in pursuit of justice.  
If government is a good that emerges out of the human condition, and if the first humans 
were in an elevated state of original justice as intended by God, then government would be 
elevated accordingly with human nature. As the prelapsarian human possessed a perfect unity of 
body and soul perfectly oriented toward God and neighbor, so too would society have been an 
organic whole developed for the good of all. The preternatural gifts given to the first humans 
would significantly affect the nature and practice of government. Above all in the state of 
original justice, the first humans would have had the perfection of virtue, directing them towards 
their proper ends, one of which is community. Where the human is ordered as he ought to be 
perfect justice ought to exist, as everyone is inclined to give the other his due.  
With the gift of freedom from moral ignorance, the first humans could have made the 
best use of the virtue of prudence in their social and political interactions with one another. 
Prudence, relating to both reason and its practical application, in its perfection would first enable 
a government in line with the will of God. Aquinas in his Treatise on Law specifies the nature of 
 
37 Aquinas, On Kingship, 1.5.  
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human law as a practical extension of the natural law. 38 No law apart from the natural law can 
be true law, though it shares in the nature of law as it shares the characteristics of law (legitimate 
authority, promulgation, etc.).39 With freedom from ignorance of the moral law, community in 
original justice could ensure that human law is consistent with the moral law and adds to it only 
in ways meaningful and beneficial to society. Justice would be done in that each is given to 
according to his needs, and expected from according to her ability; unjust inequality would not 
exist.  
Though there would be no room for inequity in prelapsarian society, Aquinas argued for 
the goodness of private property. In the Summa, he writes, “Community of goods is ascribed to 
the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common 
and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because the division of possessions is not 
according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive 
law…Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition 
thereto devised by human reason.”40 By taking this position, as Chroust and Affeldt write, 
Aquinas attempts a compromise between the apocalyptic idealism of the early Church, who 
believed that the rejection of private property was the “result of true brotherly love,” and 
Aristotle, who extolled private property and to whom Aquinas adhered closely.41 By asserting 
that the distribution of private property is not according to natural law but human law, Aquinas 
admits the possibility that some distributions of wealth could be unjust, meaning that private 
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property cannot be an absolute right. However, as he has stated that no law is law if it is unjust, 
this begs the question as to what constitutes an unjust legal distribution of wealth and property 
and at what point the right to property is forfeit due to inequity. Given the perfect orientation of 
the human will and mediation of human desires in the state of original justice, it seems 
impossible that such an unjust distribution would arise in this condition. 
Freedom from ignorance would affect not only law and social structures, but the ways in 
which people actively participate within them. No person could unwittingly support a public 
action that would cause harm or injustice to another, nor could a person be deceived into backing 
a policy they would otherwise reject on reason. Assuming that pre-Fall humankind would not 
have unlimited knowledge of things beyond the moral realm, freedom of ignorance paradoxically 
would allow for recognition of one’s own lack of knowledge in any particular area. It would 
enable a humility that allows a person to cede leadership and authority to those most capable of 
performing the proper civic responsibilities. For those in these positions of authority, exemption 
from ignorance would grant a different type of humility. Prudence would remind leaders not only 
of the divine origin of their authority, but also of the service that authority entails.  
In combination with infused moral knowledge and freedom from ignorance, the gift of 
integrity also adds to the best possible human community. The condition of appetites subordinate 
to reason eliminates the possibility of any personal motive or urge to action that is contrary to 
what is proper. No desire for pleasure, power, or personal gain would distract a person away 
from striving to the best of his ability to reach his God-intended ends. Each would truly will the 
best for the human community and possess the fortitude necessary to act upon it, and thus no one 
would have any reason to conceal any hidden motives. All authority would be used for the 
benefit of all without regard for personal gain, and delegation of authority would be determined 
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for the good of all rather than the few. Each person would work on behalf of all, knowing that all 
are working on his behalf. 
Given the way in which elevated human nature determines the characteristics of elevated 
government, how would human nature as such dictate the form of government? In On Kingship, 
Aquinas borrows Aristotle’s different types of government, each with both a true and perverted 
form: rule by one (kingship and tyranny), the few (aristocracy and oligarchy) and the many 
(polity and democracy).42 However, Aquinas disagrees ultimately with Aristotle’s conclusions. 
Aristotle, finding monarchy impracticable although with the greatest potential, argues for a 
constitutional government—one combining the features of aristocracy and democracy. On the 
other hand, Aquinas holds monarchy as both the highest form of government and one that is 
often practical.43 Thus, this must also be the form of government correspondent to the state of 
original justice. He notes that as leadership in God, nature, and the body is by a unity, the 
government of people by people should also be a unity, stating that monarchy’s singular 
character gives the greatest stability and security to a society.44 However, in his Summa he also 
extols the government of Israel under Moses, noting its concurrent monarchical, aristocratic, and 
democratic elements.45  
In consideration of these forms of government in relation to the nature of elevated 
humanity, I concur with Aquinas in that government in original justice must be some form of 
monarchy by way of meritocracy. Using their preternatural gifts afforded by original justice, the 
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many would dutifully cede their claims to authority to the one among them who is most qualified 
to serve the people, as the expedience of action and civil order that come from unity of 
leadership would be most beneficial for society, and especially as he understands the 
responsibility of service that comes with leadership. However, the one who assumes authority 
must necessarily have the humility to realize that even he alone does not have all the answers to 
all of the needs of the people, and so he must surround himself with those capable of advising 
him and must delegate some degree of authority to others who can effectively manage more local 
concerns. Additionally, the nature of the human person as a social and political being means that 
each human being has a desire to contribute and ought to assist in the greater well-being of her 
society, contributing where her unique abilities and talents can add to the common good. 
Ultimately, then, this ideal system of government looks quite a bit like the “mixed constitution” 
Aquinas endorses in his Summa: a society where all are can be, at least to a degree, active 
participants in governance.  
In the state of original justice, humanity would have been capable of just that—a society 
rooted in perfect justice, aiming at what is truly good, where each person is treated according to 
his worth as a rational being created by God. If humanity is made in the image and likeness of 
God, then the perfect human community would not be far from the Kingdom of God. 
The Fall of Humankind and the Dawn of Original Sin 
Though such a perfect community under God would have been nice, it appears never to 
have materialized as such. Genesis 3 contains the familiar myth of the beginnings of human 
sin—the serpent persuaded the woman, who gave the fruit to the man, whose sin prompted God 
to cast the two of them out of Eden. Aquinas suspects that it was a tension between human nature 
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and God’s grace, even in this state of original justice, that created the grounds for the first sin.46 
While humans were in a deep and perfect friendship with God, it was a perfection according to 
the human sense of perfect; the first humans never saw God “in his essence,” as Aquinas 
believes is the teleological end of human existence. If they had, they would have been unable to 
turn away, their hearts finding the rest Augustine pines for in Confessions.47 Whether Aquinas’ 
interpretation is correct remains a mystery, but as is easily verifiable by the universal human 
experience, that perfect community that could and ought to have persisted did not. The first 
humans chose to sin, and in doing so shattered both the supernatural relationship of humanity to 
God and each other and the supernatural unity of the human person.  
The notion of original sin is one of the central aspects of the Catholic understanding of 
human nature, but also perhaps one of the most overlooked in the modern era, post-
Enlightenment. Original sin can be understood in two senses—first, as the personal sin of the 
first humans, and second, as the persisting effects of their sin.48 It ought to be noted that even the 
condition of original sin is the result of human failure in personal sin. The first understanding of 
original sin so begets the second, as it was the sin of the first humans that led to the loss of 
original justice, and it is this latter sense of original sin that is most useful in discussing fallen 
nature. Contrasted with the state of original justice, original sin in this second sense describes the 
condition of humanity following the personal sin of the first humans. Through our corporate 
 
46 John A. Hardon, S.J., "Thesis  Ⅸ : Adam Lost Original Justice by Sinning Gravely. Original Sin 
Therefore Exists in All Men as a True Sin, Proper to Each Person and Transmitted from Adam by Propagation," in 
God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural. http://www.therealpresence.org/archives/God/God_014.htm. 
47 ST 1.94.1. 
48 Stéphane Harent, "Original Sin," in Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 
1911). 
22 
connection with them, though we have not inherited personal guilt through their actions, we have 
inherited the consequences of their sin. Ratzinger writes,  
In the Genesis story that we are considering…sin is not spoken of in general as an 
abstract possibility but as a deed, as the sin of a particular person, Adam, who 
stands at the origin of humankind and with whom the history of sin begins. The 
account tells us that sin begets sin, and that therefore all the sins of history are 
interlinked. Theology refers to this state of affairs by the certainly misleading and 
imprecise term “original sin.”49  
How, then, ought we to understand original sin? Aquinas gives a definition: “Original sin 
denotes the privation of original justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts 
of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit.”50 Equating original sin to 
a disease, Aquinas notes two aspects to original sin: privation of original justice, that is primarily 
sanctifying grace, and the resulting effects on the order of the soul. Without this supernatural 
grace, humanity is kept away from his supernatural end, friendship with God.  
This privation extends not only to this lifetime but also for the next. Humans as finite 
beings, though created with an eternal end in mind, have no right to enter the kingdom of heaven 
on their own merit. However, God, knowing that humankind had rebelled against him and loving 
his creation anyway, made restoration of grace possible through the death and resurrection of his 
Son, who became like a new, sinless first man. Aquinas argues in the Summa for the 
“fittingness” of the Incarnation as a correction for sin, but acknowledges immediately in his 
response that others disagree and that God certainly could have chosen to become incarnate 
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anyway.51 Given that Christ is the perfect representation of humanity as the “image and likeness” 
of God, one may find it equally as fitting that Christ become incarnate to bridge the ontological 
gap between God and humanity, an argument similar to the one Aquinas makes for the existence 
of angels.52  
For the remission of original sin, the Church gives the sacrament of baptism as a death to 
the world and a resurrection and ingratiation into the life of Christ. However, while baptism may 
offer reconciliation with God and extend the offer of God’s grace, it cannot offer the restoration 
of original justice. Grace is still offered to humanity, but it no longer creates the state of original 
justice. Because of this, original sin necessarily has consequences for all people. The human 
reality can never again be what it was, as humans are confined to their creatureliness and the 
imperfection that comes along with it. Human nature without the grace of God is a tendency to 
disorder, away from community with God and fellow humans. Though humans are still created 
as equal in the image and likeness of God, they are also equal in the state of original sin, and this 
tension becomes the defining characteristic of humankind.   
Aquinas, following Bede, condenses the material effects of original sin into four wounds 
of nature—ignorance, malice, weakness, and concupiscence. Each of these corresponds to one of 
the four parts of the soul (reason, will, irascible, concupiscible) and its proper virtue (prudence, 
justice, temperance, or fortitude).53 Though both prelapsarian and postlapsarian humanity share 
the capacity for virtue, as that is essential to human nature, they differ in that while the former 
was infused with all virtues, the latter is left with only the capacity to hold them. The purpose of 
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human existence and the hope of unity with God remain the same as human nature remains 
fundamentally good, but the path to this unity is darkened with the loss of original justice and the 
specific gifts that it entailed. 
The first wound of nature, ignorance, is the absence of infused knowledge. Aquinas 
describes ignorance as “the reason lacking its orientation toward true good.”54 If the reason is no 
longer perfectly oriented toward true good—primarily God—then it becomes twisted away from 
God and towards self. Thus, ignorance is primarily a tendency to self-deception in pride, as 
original sin obscures the view of God. Rather than seeing God as God, humans tend to see self as 
God, ignoring personal fault, inability, and vice. This is, not coincidentally, the temptation of the 
serpent in Genesis: "You certainly will not die! God knows well that when you eat of it your 
eyes will be opened and you will be like gods…”55 Certainly, God did know the effects of sin. 
The first humans and their descendants came to know evil in the sense that they experienced it 
themselves, and they became like Gods insofar as they wrongly exalt themselves as gods.  
In practice, the ignorance of original sin manifests as a failure to see good clearly, a lack 
of knowledge of what is right or just, and the inability to follow through on right reason—the 
absence of prudence. Aquinas’s reference to a need for divine law reflects at least partially on the 
inadequacy of human reason to reach the ends for which humanity is intended.56 In ignorance, a 
person can fail to know morality in both theoretical and practical senses; good and evil often 
blend together. Not only can humans be ignorant, but they can be deceived into believing 
untruths that right reason would prove false. Here not only the ability to acquire and retain 
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knowledge is hindered, but the ability of reason itself to decide truth from fiction and right from 
wrong is also limited. Irrational pride can often be at the center of this as an unwillingness to 
admit error, or even the possibility of error.  
This tendency toward self-deception continues with the wound of malice, defined by 
Aquinas as the condition in which the will is “deprived of its order of good;” the absence of 
justice.57 The good Aquinas is referring to here is not only God, but fellow humans. Looking 
back to Augustine’s remark on happiness mentioned in the first subsection, he notes that it is in 
God alone that we find true happiness, and that within us we naturally have a desire to turn 
toward God in order to find our happiness. Malice, on the other hand, is a tendency to turn 
inwards toward self, away from the goodness of God. It is an innate obstacle to relationship, as 
one begins to seek personal gain rather than mutual benefit or the good of the other. A focus on 
self makes implementing justice difficult, as it is easy to see one’s own condition as more dire or 
one’s own needs greater in comparison to another.58  
Thirdly is the wound of weakness, particularly regarding the irascible appetite. Once 
again taking from Aquinas’s description, weakness is present “in so far as the irascible is 
deprived of its order to the arduous.”59 Weakness is a susceptibility to do what is easy rather than 
what is right. Even if a person has reason in knowing what the right thing is to do, he may lack 
the willpower to do it. In a more diluted sense, weakness can also manifest as laziness and 
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aversion of difficulty in any way, seeking material comfort over labor. Whereas in original 
justice labor was seen as a good, it is now often felt as an unneeded burden. Weakness could also 
include inability to restrain excessive or unwarranted anger.  
Finally is the wound of concupiscence. While Aquinas says that original sin is formally 
the deprivation of sanctifying grace, it exists materially as concupiscence, the escape of desire 
from reason’s grasp.60 If the state of original sin is in sum a tendency to turn toward earthly 
goods—food, drink, leisure, sensual pleasure, power and authority—concupiscence epitomizes 
this tendency. As mentioned previously, desire is not bad in itself; earthly goods are to be 
enjoyed in moderation under the virtue of temperance. Desire becomes harmful, however, when 
uncontrolled by the reason. Where before the Fall, desire for earthly goods was held in line with 
the will of God, afterward, desire is often capable of overpowering reason. With original justice 
gone, it is hard to imagine any action taken solely for the benefit of another. Even objectively 
good actions are often motivated by desire for appraisal or for a sense of pride. Paradoxically, in 
the recognition that happiness is found in willing the good of others, happiness for oneself 
becomes the motivation for action on behalf of others rather than their own benefit.  
Aquinas is theologically accurate in detailing the intrinsic effects of original sin, with his 
description of original sin becoming the bedrock of Catholic teaching on the matter. However, 
what Aquinas does less well is addressing the personal and societal reality of original sin, and as 
such, inadequately assesses the depth and breadth of its consequences. In particular, Aquinas 
fails to capture the extent of the metaphysical tension found in the human person. This is partly a 
product of his writing style and his era, but also attributable at least partly to his theology. In 
contrast, Augustine, writing nearly a millennium earlier, provides an alternative model for the 
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effects of original sin and the nature of fallen humanity, in which he perceives more greatly the 
reality the personal dimension of sin and the way in which it impacts relationship. 
Though Aquinas borrows much from Augustine, the two differ on the nature of (original) 
sin. Aquinas bases his theory of sin, like much of his writing, on reason and law: “a human act is 
evil through lacking conformity with its due measure…Now there are two rules of the human 
will: one is proximate and homogenous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the 
eternal law, which is God’s reason, so to speak.”61 Even in the fomes (kindling wood) of sin is 
there something resembling law, albeit in the sense of diversion from law and with 
corresponding consequence.62 Where Aquinas sees sin primarily as disordered reason, Augustine 
sees sin as disordered love.63 From the differing definitions of sin, it becomes apparent that the 
two differ about in which part of the soul sin ultimately originates. Aquinas argues reason, 
saying that pride is the “beginning of every sin;”64 Augustine argues instead for concupiscence.  
The biggest contrast between the two, however, is that while Aquinas interprets original 
sin more simply as the loss of the supernatural and preternatural gifts associated with original 
justice, Augustine interprets it as a direct degradation of human nature itself, which is 
responsible for a conflict between flesh and spirit.65 It is within this framework that Augustine 
laments in The City of God, “For why is it that we remember with difficulty, and without 
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difficulty forget? learn with difficulty, and without difficulty remain ignorant? are diligent with 
difficulty, and without difficulty are indolent? Does not this show what vitiated nature inclines 
and tends to by its own weight, and what succour it needs if it is to be delivered?”66 Akin to Paul 
in Romans 7, even after his conversion to Christianity, Augustine could feel that there was a 
significant failure to do good not only within himself, but within all humanity, that could only be 
explained by a direct injury to what it meant to be human. Centuries after Aquinas, Martin 
Luther felt so broken by sin that he went entirely past Catholic theology on grace and salvation.  
I am certainly not suggesting that we do the same. It has long been held by Catholic 
theology that humans are made in the image and likeness of God, and that creation as such 
imparts an inherent goodness to humanity. However, the degree to which original sin and 
tendency to disorder cloud this goodness is up for debate, and perhaps it may be time for a return 
to consideration of human sinfulness in Catholic thought in light of creation in the image of God. 
Humanity has the capacity for both commendable good and egregious evil. Augustine remarks, 
“For there is nothing so social by nature, so anti-social by sin, as man.”67 It is this attitude that 
proves necessary in addressing human nature, and particularly in supplementing Aquinas’s 
thought on the subject. Some things can certainly be taken away from the more “pessimistic” 
Christian traditions and writers and ought to be held in tension with the more “optimistic” 
writings of those like Aquinas, who emphasize the human capacity for virtue even in the face of 
original sin and the natural tendency to disorder. A philosophy of hopeful realism seems to best 
encapsulate an authentically Catholic theory of human nature, embracing the human orientation 
toward God while acknowledging the tendency toward self.  
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Political Community after the Fall 
Madison continues his thought, writing, “If angels were to govern men, neither external 
nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”68 If human 
nature has been changed through original sin, then the proper nature of government must 
necessarily change to account for it. Aquinas, while addressing this change in human nature, 
maintains that monarchy is the superior form of government. In doing so, he fails to amend his 
theory to the extent needed to effectively “control government” as Madison believes necessary. 
While Aquinas’s vision of monarchy could possibly be the form of government most consistent 
with prelapsarian humanity, it simply does not lend itself to cooperation with fallen human 
nature. In taking a “hopefully realistic” approach to politics in light of original sin, it becomes 
clear that democracy69 is the best response to the fallen human condition, most directly 
addressing human nature as a tension between creation as good and tendency toward evil.  
As a result of the Fall, government itself dramatically changes character. Most 
prominently, government becomes not only a means for social organization and direction to a 
common good, but a means to keep sinful impulses in check and create legal protection from the 
sinful acts of others, so much so that political theorist Max Weber notably defines the state as the 
human institution which maintains a “monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force" within 
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a particular geographical area.70 It is likely that Aquinas thought coercion would be unnecessary 
before the Fall, but this point is nonetheless debated among scholars.71 Regardless what Aquinas 
thought on this matter, it must be the case that the coercive power of government under threat of 
violence necessarily originates in sin. How else could deprivation of life, liberty, or property be 
thought of as good except as protection from greater evil? Augustine agrees on this point, saying,  
But because God does not wholly desert those whom He condemns, nor shuts up 
in His anger His tender mercies, the human race is restrained by law and 
education, which keep guard against the ignorance that besets us, and oppose the 
assaults of vice, but are themselves full of labour and sorrow. For what mean 
those multifarious threats which are used to restrain the folly of children? What 
mean pedagogues, masters, the birch, the strap, the cane, the schooling which 
Scripture says must be given a child, ‘beating him on the sides lest he wax 
stubborn,’ and it be hardly possible or not possible at all to subdue him? Why all 
these punishments, save to overcome ignorance and bridle evil desires—these 
evils with which we come into the world?72 
While both Augustine and Aquinas agree that there would be some form of social 
organization and authority before the Fall, Augustine argues that authority exercised before the 
Fall could not have been considered political authority, while, as mentioned previously, Aquinas 
believes the opposite.73 This may appear to be semantics, however, it offers two differing 
theories of postlapsarian government. In arguing that political authority is coercive to such a 
large degree that it cannot be such authority without it, Augustine is suggesting that government 
is intended primarily to restrict the negative aspects of fallen nature than to promote and develop 
the positive aspects of human nature, largely the acquisition of virtue. Aquinas’s arguments 
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defending political authority as means to the common good are convincing for the opposite 
point. If lawmaking and civic organization for the promotion of the common good are taken to 
be the essential function of government, then coercion becomes an aspect of government 
necessarily melded to the essential after the Fall, as original sin permanently impacts human 
nature. Though government’s purpose remains the same, its effectiveness in reaching its goals 
diminishes and it can often fall prey to the human tendency to injustice.  
For example, in City of God, Augustine contrasts the peace of nations with the peace of 
God. He argues that while the former peace as the absence of violence is not the ultimate aim of 
the human person, it does share to a degree in the nature of the peace of God which is a peace of 
the soul. Augustine writes, “He, then, who prefers what is right to what is wrong, and what is 
well-ordered to what is perverted, sees that the peace of unjust men is not worthy to be called 
peace in comparison with the peace of the just. And yet even what is perverted must of necessity 
be in harmony with, and in dependence on, and in some part of the order of things, for otherwise 
it would have no existence at all.”74 Good ends often seem to require imperfect means, and the 
best ends are often unattainable.  
Defeatism is wholly unproductive, but undue optimism can also be problematic. In the 
last few decades especially, there has been a tendency within progressive theologies and 
movements to focus on social sin and unjust structures. Social sin is defined by John Paul II as 
the sin that “refers to the relationships between the various human communities. These 
relationships are not always in accordance with the plan of God, who intends that there be justice 
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in the world and freedom and peace between individuals, groups and peoples.”75 Societal 
institutions can very well perpetuate and reenergize injustice. However, it must not be forgotten 
that social sin originates through the personal sin of individuals. Institutions themselves are not 
moral actors, but they are acted within by persons who are. Naturally, human-created institutions 
such as the state can only be as good as the individuals in positions of authority within them. 
Gustavo Gutierrez writes,  
Sin—a breach of friendship with God and others—is according to the Bible the 
ultimate cause of poverty, injustice, and the oppression in which men live. In 
describing sin as the ultimate cause we do not in any way negate the structural 
reasons and the objective determinants leading to these situations. It does, 
however, emphasize the fact that things do not happen by chance and that behind 
an unjust structure there is a personal or collective will responsible—a willingness 
to reject God and neighbor. It suggests, likewise, that a social transformation, no 
matter how radical it may be, does not automatically achieve the suppression of 
all evils.76 
Gutierrez goes on to explain that the liberation of the human person is truly found in community 
of the individual with God and with her fellow humans.77  
In order that this may be a reality, one must address structural sin, but must also 
recognize that perfect society cannot exist while human nature remains inevitably flawed. For 
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example, some degree of economic inequity seems unavoidable in any post-Fall society simply 
due to human greed. Intemperance with wealth and a failure to recognize the need of others 
mean that some amass wealth without regard for the common good. While adjustment of social 
structures cannot entirely alleviate the problem of sin in society, it can, however, alleviate the 
prevailing degree of present injustice. In this case, though government may never fully eradicate 
distributive injustice, that does not mean that government should not take steps to bring its 
people out of poverty by methods such as redistribution of wealth or creation of considerable 
incentive for charitable giving.  
On a broader scale, though government itself will never be perfectly just, the type and 
structure of government do matter in creating a more just society. As mentioned previously, 
Aquinas finds monarchy to be the form of government most conducive to human flourishing 
because of its likeness to God presiding over the created universe. While in original justice, 
kingship may have been the best form of government from the standpoint of practicality and 
expedience, given the wounded nature of fallen humanity, this can no longer be the case. The 
human tendency to self-deception, rationalization of evil, and self-aggrandizement is crucial in 
this consideration. Any system of government giving any individual a practically unlimited level 
of power is overwhelmingly subject to corruption and abuse, to the detriment of society at large. 
A monarchy such as the one Aquinas suggests certainly falls under this category.  
If human society were able without fail to conjure up a perfect leader who could be 
trusted with endless authority and thrive in Aquinas’ system, I would concede that Aquinas may 
have been right. However, this is certainly not the case. The world today suffers no shortage of 
brutal authoritarianism and unforgiving capitalism, of government officials and businessmen 
keener on lining their pocketbooks than helping the globe’s seemingly infinite destitute. In 
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response, a well-functioning postlapsarian society must be adequately governed to keep the 
worst impulses of even the best people in check and to address the systemic ills caused by 
personal fault.  
In comparison to monarchy, democracy more clearly parallels the nature of fallen 
humanity and works most effectively to manage these limitations while also upholding the social 
nature of the human person. Lutheran theologian Reinhold Niebuhr writes in the foreword to The 
Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, “Man's capacity for justice makes democracy 
possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."78 In this statement, we 
find a parallel to the intrapersonal tension created by creation in the image and likeness of God 
and existence in a state of original sin. In response, democracy itself is also a balance, as it 
affirms the human capacity to govern, but not to govern absolutely. If one believes that because 
of original sin no human is morally perfect, so as to rule without limitations on her authority, 
then monarchy no longer makes sense as a form of government. One who recognizes that he is 
inherently limited and morally flawed, as all humans are, ought to also recognize that his human 
nature does not pair well with a role affording seemingly limitless power. In contrast, a person 
who fails to recognize her own failure is drawn to authority as a means of acting upon her own 
selfish interests and apparent perfection. Plato addresses this latter notion in his Republic with 
the oft-cited “ship of state” metaphor.79 Though he uses it as a way to justify rule by the 
“philosopher king,” as the sailors argue over who among the unfitting should be the captain of 
the ship, it demonstrates the same core issue with political authority seen so often today—that 
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many who seek civil authority are less concerned with their own ability to exercise good 
judgement then their ability to amass power or to impose upon others their own vision of the 
good. Given this reality, a strong democracy not only gives the public the ability to select their 
own leaders but ought to limit the power of these elected leaders, ideally keeping power in the 
hands of the many rather than the few.  
However, even with democracy there remains the potential for evil if government is not 
adequately designed to protect against abuse of power. Fallen human nature pushes against 
institutional restraints in search of self-glorification via pleasure and power, contrary to God’s 
intent for humanity. Thus, checks and balances on authority are necessary to prevent democracy 
from devolving into elected tyranny. This was one of the clear concerns of the Framers, 
mentioned in the section-opening excerpt from Federalist No. 51.80 Ideally, a democracy ought 
to have a governing document and series of institutions with clearly defined and limited powers, 
where even if one organization or institution seeks to grab more than its appropriate share of 
authority, the envy (or right judgment) of other institutions and the enforcement of governing 
norms will maintain the balance of power. This is easier said than done, of course. Likely even 
the most proactive thinkers cannot create a document with absolutely no loopholes to be 
exploited. At this point, the goal is not to create the perfect system of government, but one which 
allows for as little abuse as possible, because some degree is unavoidable.  
To this point, discussion of democracy has been essentially as risk aversion to the pitfalls 
of other governing methods. However, though the necessity of democracy is partially due to the 
sinful imperfection of humanity, its benefit is not entirely as risk-aversion. It also helps to affirm 
the good in the human person by promoting the essentially social nature of humanity. As 
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affirmed previously, Aquinas (using Aristotle) sees the human community as essentially 
political, writing that the human person is “naturally a civic and social animal,” created for 
relationship.81 He also maintains that government is part of the ideal community, in which laws 
are made for the purpose of creating good people who can live in harmony with one another.82 
After the Fall, however, government seems to be less capable of creating good people (or good 
citizens), though it does retain some ability through its coercive power. Further still, as Aquinas 
agrees, government must necessarily be limited in its scope, as it lacks the authority to moderate 
some areas of personal and social conduct without being heavy-handed or overly intrusive.83 
However, when government and leaders do exercise authority, these decisions often result in 
systemic injustice, whether intentionally or unintentionally. In response, distrust of government 
among the public runs high, as laws are viewed not as dictates of reason in accordance with the 
divine will, but as unnecessary and cumbersome restrictions on human freedom.  
In this environment, democracy succeeds more than other forms of government by 
creating the grounds for positive civil and social engagement. Whereas a monarchy can exist 
independently from the people it rules, true democracy cannot operate without participation from 
its citizens. With power held by the public, candidates for office voluntarily emerge from the 
populace and are chosen by election, beholden to the will of the people by the length of their 
terms. These structures encourage the public to participate in government by offering them 
agency and handing them the keys to their own success. Of course, without mandatory voting, 
not everyone will choose to participate in governance, choosing instead to remain “apolitical.” 
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However, among those that do participate, there is a recognition that one’s own interests are best 
served by engagement in political life, which given the proper structures entails cooperation and 
compromise with other people in the search for the common good. In this way, democracy 
encourages the social nature of humanity by using self-interested post-Fall nature. If Aquinas 
argues that law can help create good citizens (if not good people) by creating the framework in 
which people can develop virtue, even if it may not be perfectly effective due to sinful nature, 
then democracy as a means of government does this better than monarchy by creating channels 
for positive social engagement through the direct incorporation of citizens into the process of 
governance. In this way, more so than any other form of government, democracy creates a set of 
conditions in which it is possible to restore at least partially the social relationship damaged by 
original sin.  
Is democracy then a guarantee of justice? Certainly not—democracy is simply the highest 
level of functioning government which, in theory, could be exercised in perpetuity without 
devolving into tyranny. Even this is not as easy as it seems. The prospect of “tyranny of the 
majority” is one that must be taken into account, in the instance that a majority of a population 
would place their own interests above the common good. In a direct democracy like the one 
Aristotle would have experienced, uninhibited rule of the fifty-percent-plus-one could very well 
be devastating to those on the other side. The role of legislators in a democratic republic is to 
mitigate the potential consequences of such a mob rule, in the hope that they as the best of the 
public might exercise their prudential judgement in protection of justice. However, at some 
point, the majority inevitably holds the ability to choose its own legislators, at which point if the 
legislators lack concern for justice, the only thing preventing gross injustice is the framework of 
democracy itself. The human nature of those in power inevitably pushes up against the 
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institutions they find themselves in, and it is unclear whether any system of government—even 
democracy—can truly stand up to the force that is humanity itself.   
Concluding Thoughts: Hope and the Role of the Church 
Given this portrait of human nature and the corresponding response of government, what 
ought to be the individual’s response to the situation in which he finds himself? Facing up to the 
reality of a world rife with injustice, with no reprieve in sight, is most definitely a daunting task. 
It can be all too easy to become hardened and calloused to the point where one no longer feels 
compassion for those victimized by others or society. On the other hand, even the most well-
intentioned can be worn down and broken by the sheer volume of hurt they must witness if they 
are to remain committed to the prospect of a more just world. How are we supposed to continue 
the work of God, to build a more just world, knowing we’ll never see it finished in our lifetimes? 
The answer, though not an easy one, lies right within Aquinas’ own thought. There 
remains no sure way to address injustice in politics (or any injustice, really) other than by the 
cultivation of virtue. The four wounds of original sin directly correspond to the four cardinal 
virtues, making human effort in this area quite necessary. In order to work with the grace of God 
and experience happiness as intended for humanity—or at least as close as is possible in this 
lifetime—humans are in desperate need of virtue. Particularly, I believe the theological virtue of 
hope is necessary in the life of the Christian individual who recognizes the need to engage in the 
world in the manner that democracy allows him to. Aquinas writes that “the object of hope is a 
future good, difficult but possible to obtain…Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as 
being possible to us by means of the divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose 
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help it leans.”84 Through the virtue of hope, humans are properly able to see their proper 
teleological end—final unity with God. As we make use of this virtue, we are not yet properly in 
view of this end, but we are “on the way”—in status viatoris. The human longing for the fullness 
of God will never be satisfied in this life, no matter how frequently we volunteer for charity, vote 
in elections or protest the injustice in our midst. Though these things may be goods and bring us 
a degree of happiness in communion with our human brothers and sisters, we ought not confuse 
them with our final good—God, Godself. The virtue of hope allows one to persevere in the work 
of God on earth, including in political life, with faith that one day, things may be made right at 
the end of time and in eternal life with God.  
If human institutions can only be as good as those people who create and lead them, the 
world will be more just if we can personally help others grow to be more virtuous. But before 
institutions are limited by human nature, they must be created as just as they can be, and there is 
clearly work to be done in making this a reality. Both of these are precisely what ought to be the 
Church’s role within democracy. First and foremost, the Church’s responsibility is the salvation 
of souls while and through aiding in the development of moral people. On the proper task of the 
Church, Navone writes, “Jesus comes primarily and directly to heal the heart and spirit of man in 
relation to God his Father. He comes to heal the material and social order only secondarily and 
indirectly, inasmuch as the healing of man at the core of his being necessarily entails the healing 
of the whole man and his environment.”85 The Church, in the continuation of Jesus’ mission, 
ought to embody this same purpose.  
 
84 ST 2-2.17.1. 
85 John J. Navone, A Theology of Failure (New York: Paulist Press, 1974), 36. 
40 
However, the institutional Church would be remiss if it did not also address the physical 
and structural concerns of the world’s people. Even if the Church carries primarily a spiritual 
mission, it must often minister first to the physical needs of the people it longs to bring into 
relationship with God. In the Scriptures, it is often unclear whether those seeking Jesus’ healing 
saw him primarily as a source of spiritual or physical restoration, but even if the latter, the 
encounters provided an opportunity for Jesus to reach not just bodies but souls. Seeing the good 
of community and civic participation, the Church ought to take marked stances in favor of not 
only democracy, but for the rights of the people whom it governs. James writes that faith without 
works is dead,86 but so also are works without faith—neither can survive without the other. The 
Church can facilitate this relationship by reminding the world of the purpose for any and all 
works of human charity, encouraging this kind of engagement not as an extension of faith but as 
something integral to it.  Even when faced with the depths of human imperfection and failure, 
even from within its own ranks, the Church ought to stand as a beacon of light in a darkened 
world, sharing hope of the world yet to come.  
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Part II: One Faith, Many Faithful—A Study of American Catholic Voters 
Introduction  
Catholics make up the largest single religious group in the United States and comprise 
about 20 percent of registered voters. However, this does not mean that they act uniformly when 
it comes to voting and party preference. At least in the past few decades, the “Catholic vote” has 
become relatively unpredictable, with an increasingly even split between the two major political 
parties. Based on these observations, it would be safe to say that there are other factors besides a 
person’s association with Catholicism that influence his or her political leanings and partisan 
affiliation—perhaps his or her interpretation and practice of Catholicism. What religious 
attitudes and practices, if any, can accurately predict party affiliation among American 
Catholics? Compared to research on other religious traditions, there is a surprising lack of 
attention on the party affiliation and political attitudes of Catholics, especially with regard to the 
ways in which they are linked to religious belief and practice. Unfortunately, Catholicism as a 
determinant of political belief seems to stay largely out of the public eye, save for discussion of 
homosexuality, abortion, and birth control. A greater understanding of Catholics and partisan 
attitudes could be quite valuable both for politicians seeking to understand their demographics 
and for Catholics seeking to understand themselves.  
Trends in American Religiosity 
The United States has always been a widely and deeply religious nation compared to 
much of the Western world. Results from the General Social Survey suggest that about nine out 
of ten Americans pray at least occasionally, three out of four pray at least once a week, and over 
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three out of ten describe themselves as strongly religious.87 Religiosity also seems to follow a 
predictable pattern in the life cycle. Putnam notes that religiosity tends to increase as people 
enter their thirties as people begin to settle down and start families and again as they approach 
the end of their lives.88  
Despite consistency of these religious metrics, it does appear that beginning in the 1960s, 
religious attendance has decreased slightly over the past few decades; generational differences do 
factor into this, but younger generations have lower levels of attendance than previous 
generations at their age.89 If society is becoming less religious, one would expect religiosity to 
have a smaller impact on cultural attitudes and perhaps expect a wider cultural divide between 
the religious and non-religious. However, as noted above, while attendance numbers have been 
decreasing, religious behavior in other ways has held constant, pointing to a persisting and 
prominent role for religion in the American social sphere.  
Partisanship and Religious Identity 
Historically, scholars have held that macropartisanship is quite predictable and largely 
constant across election cycles. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes note that partisanship 
among American voters is highly stable over time, documented both by election results and by 
surveys of partisan preference.90 They find that only about twenty percent of voters have 
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changed party allegiance within their lifetimes, corroborating their understanding of this stability 
in voter preferences.  
Looking beyond the individual level of analysis, group identity has been shown to play a 
role in determining partisanship. In The American Voter, Angus Campbell  discovers a 
significant impact of group identity among union members, blacks, Catholics, and Jews, as each 
of these groups is more likely to identify as Democrats than other social characteristics would 
predict.91 On the other hand, Protestants have been historically more likely to be Republican. The 
impact of religion on partisanship generally appears to correspond with attendance and 
religiosity, as those with higher levels in both categories tend to skew more Republican and 
conservative in ideology than their less-religious and less frequently-practicing counterparts.92  
A History of Catholic Partisanship 
As Campbell notes, the “Catholic vote” used to be reliably and disproportionately 
Democratic.93 In the 1960 presidential election, nationally, Catholics voted for Kennedy at a rate 
of 78 percent, compared to 22 percent for Nixon. Although this may be a special case (Kennedy 
being the first Catholic presidential candidate for a major party), for the better part of the 
twentieth century, the voting split among Catholics consistently landed in favor of the 
Democratic party. However, this is no longer the case. The shift observed among the Catholic 
voter base would almost necessarily require a significant number of people to shift their patterns 
of identification and voting, a possible exception to the findings of Campbell et al. Over the past 
four decades, the “Catholic vote” has increasingly become a swing vote, comprised of large 
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Democratic and Republican blocs and a smaller bloc of independents.94 As a result, the 
American Catholic voter is becoming less distinct from the American voter. Streb and Frederick 
find that over a three decade American National Election Studies sample of individual 
ideological identification, the percentage breakdown of Catholic liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives nearly parallels the breakdown of non-Catholic voters, though a slightly larger 
number of Catholics have consistently identified as moderates. 95 
Theories of Catholic Partisanship 
The simplest explanation for the broader rightward movement among Catholics is a 
change in the demographics of the American Catholic population, particularly regarding race, 
age, and area of residence. While near the beginning of the twentieth century, American 
Catholics were largely working-class Irish, Italian, and Eastern European immigrants, often 
subject to virulent anti-Catholic discrimination, these groups began to assimilate into American 
society near the middle of the century. As a result, the statistically average Catholic has become 
more and more similar to the statistically average American. Even as early as 1961, Greer finds 
in a study of St. Louis, Missouri the beginning of the end of Democratic dominance and the 
origins of a conservative bloc of Catholic voters. He attributes this trend to “acculturation, 
vertical mobility, and suburbanization.”96 Half a century later, Ryan and Milazzo pick up this 
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same hypothesis.97 They successfully link changing patterns of partisanship to Catholic 
migration out of the cities and into the suburbs, while also noting the (lesser) importance of 
ideological alignment and the Democratic Party’s position on abortion.  
On the other hand, shifting racial demographics in the population of American Catholics 
have helped to maintain a sizeable Democratic voting bloc, though clearly not as strong as it 
once was.98 As the total of Catholics approaches 50 percent Latino, given that American Latinos 
tend to lean quite strongly Democratic, it would not be unreasonable to expect a significant 
percentage of Catholics to continue to vote more progressively.  
While theories relating to race and voter demographics may accurately predict some 
broader trends among Catholics consistent with the rest of the American population, they fail to 
explain why white Catholics still consistently tend to vote for Democrats more frequently than 
white Evangelical Christians. According to a 2015 Pew Report, 68 percent of white Evangelicals 
identify as a Republican or a Republican-leaning independent and 22 percent as a Democrat or 
Democratic-leaning independent, while the numbers for white Catholics are 50 percent and 41 
percent, respectively.99 Though demographics may be a significant part of the literature on party 
identification, they do not tell the entire story in this particular discrepancy.  
Religious factors might offer further insight. Variables rooted in religion have been 
shown in previous studies to have surprising influence on both policy preference and political 
affiliation. One way that religion can potentially contribute to political affiliation is through 
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particular religious beliefs and corresponding attitudes towards particular social and economic 
issues. Views on abortion have been seen widely a predictor of political affiliation among 
Catholics since Roe v. Wade, with those having more strongly negative views or placing more of 
a priority on abortion tending to associate with the Republican Party. In his seminal work on the 
Catholic voter, Prendergast argues that an overt shift in Republican positions on notable social 
concerns—primarily Catholic schools and abortion—are a major factor in the rightward shift 
among Catholics.100  
However, opposition to abortion is not the only religious belief with the potential to 
shade political affiliation and issue positions. Kellstedt and Guth find a variety of religious 
factors to influence partisanship among Catholics, including religious traditionalism, views on 
religion in politics, and influence from clergy, among others.101 Interestingly and in contrast to 
what Prendergast and others might suggest, orthodox belief among Catholics tends to correlate in 
this study with Democratic self-identification. Analysis of General Social Survey data by 
Kilburn and Fogarty links orthodoxy of belief to reduced support for torture on suspected 
terrorists.102 Another study done by Perl and McClintock links orthodoxy of belief to opposition 
to capital punishment, which makes sense given the Church’s position on the issue and focus on 
a consistent life ethic.103 
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Several studies also find a correlation between Catholic belief and economic issues. The 
aforementioned Perl and McClintock study relates Catholic belief with opposition to a “child 
cap” on welfare eligibility.104 Scheve and Stasavage successfully connect belief in God’s control 
with preference for a lower degree of social insurance, on the premise that religion and social 
welfare are both palliatives for difficult financial circumstances. 105 Interestingly, Be’ery and 
Bloom find the opposite result, namely that belief in God’s control increases support for state 
welfare not only among American Catholics, but among American and Israeli Jews as well.106  
This result affirms their hypothesis that if people believe that God is in control, they are more 
likely to believe that other people are not responsible for their own circumstances and rightly 
deserve aid. Particular religious beliefs such as the inerrancy of Scripture have been 
demonstrated by Sherkat  to be an increasingly accurate predictor of lower trust in science.107 On 
a different level of analysis, Jaeger finds that a larger percentage of Catholics within a region 
correlates positively with net support for economic redistribution.108   
Certainly, then, if religious belief can affect political attitudes, religious practice may also 
have an effect. Practice, more often than belief, is used as a measure of religiosity—actions 
generally speak louder than words. The aforementioned Kellstedt and Guth study notes a 
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significant positive correlation between Mass attendance and Republican affiliation. 109 While 
those who attend Mass more tend to vote Republican, they also tend to vote more frequently than 
their less-practicing counterparts. Smith and Walker find that unlike members of most Protestant 
denominations, among whom the most religious vote less frequently than the highly religious, 
Catholics vote at progressively higher rates with higher religiosity. 110   
These two studies seem consistent with the bulk of scholarship on this matter. However, 
other studies seem to show that religiosity and Mass attendance do not seem to be exclusively 
linked to conservative Republican policy. On the issue of capital punishment, Bias, Goldberg, 
and Hannum arrive at a similar conclusion to Perl and McClintock but using different variables, 
finding a correlation between religiosity as measured by Mass attendance and opposition to the 
death penalty. 111  
Religiosity and religious practice can also have interesting effects among subgroups of 
Catholics. Valenzuela found in a study of Latino voters that although Catholic Latinos were 
slightly more likely to support Bush in 2004 than Latinos without any religious affiliation, with 
higher Mass attendance they were significantly more likely to be supportive of social welfare 
programs and amnesty for undocumented immigrants. 112 Both of these are traditionally positions 
associated with the Democratic party. While most previous research finds correlation between 
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religiosity and Republican affiliation, these latter examples seem to suggest that this link might 
not be as strong in all cases or among certain subsets of Catholics.  
Case Selection and Methodology Rationale 
In order to properly examine the impact of religious beliefs and practices on party 
affiliation, a cross-sectional approach is most useful. This is necessary to obtain a sample most 
reflective of the broader population of American Catholics and to avoid reliance on a few 
anecdotal accounts, though that kind of study may provide a different level of insight. Therefore, 
analysis of survey data is perhaps the most effective way to implement this approach.  
In addressing the specific needs of this research question, is necessary to have access to a 
dataset that has adequate measure of both religious variables and political views. The 2014 Pew 
Forum U.S. Religious Landscape Study lends itself quite well to a study of this nature. It uses a 
questionnaire that successfully sets the stage for in-depth examination of Catholicism and its 
influence and political attitudes, providing multiple variables with which to test each hypothesis, 
some of which have rarely been used in other studies. It also has an excellent sample size, 
allowing for more detailed statistical analysis and dissection of the Catholic population.  
Krupnikov and Klar find that people who would typically identify as partisans 
increasingly identify as independents due to their frustration with party politics.113 Because of 
this trend, independent leaners share more in common with weak partisans than they do with 
pure independents. Given this, it makes more sense to include these groups with their respective 
parties than to keep them bundled together as independents.  
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For this study, I separate variables into four categories: religiosity and religious behavior, 
religious attitudes, political attitudes, and demographics. The first category contains a subjective 
response on the importance of religion, as well as various measures of religious practice, 
including frequency of church attendance, prayer, and scripture reading. 
The second category contains two subsections, the first of which is a checklist of 
religious beliefs including guidance in morality, certainty of belief in God, belief in Heaven and 
Hell, and thoughts on the Bible as the word of God. In this category I also include belief in 
evolution, though this expands beyond religion to trust in science. The second subsection 
contains attitudes towards religion, and particularly the institutional Church. This includes 
measures of traditionalism and views of the Catholic Church as rule-focused, concerned with 
money and power, too involved in politics. 
The third category, political attitudes, contains viewpoints on several different political 
issues, including the legality of abortion and marriage equality, government aid to the poor, size 
of government, and environmental laws. I hesitate to include abortion and same-sex marriage 
here, since both of these are often viewed as major moral issues in the Catholic Church, but the 
survey does not contain questions regarding their immorality—only legality—justifying their 
inclusion in this third category. 
The fourth category of variables contains a small set of basic demographics—reported 
sex, race/ethnicity, age, education level, and annual income.  
To examine the data, I use binary logistic regression, assigning “Republican/Lean 
Republican” a value of 0 and “Democratic/Lean Democratic” a value of 1. Since all variables are 
categorical and not continuous, analysis requires use of a reference variable. For groups two 
through four I use the last response in each category, generally “Don’t know/other.” For category 
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one, I use the first category, the highest frequency of participation, since there were so few 
respondents who said they did not know their level of religious practice.  
Hypotheses 
Based on previous research, I hypothesize that measures of religiosity and religious 
behavior among Catholics will correlate positively with support for the Republican party. Other 
religious measures available in the U.S. Religious Landscape Study remain largely unevaluated, 
such as frequency of personal prayer, so it is more difficult to make an accurate prediction of 
results, but it would be unsurprising to see other measures of religiosity have a similar effect on 
partisan identification.  
I also expect that various tenets or attitudes will show correlation with various parties. 
Catholic doctrine is not condensable into either main party platform, so orthodoxy on these 
positions or an increased emphasis on upholding these values will likely swing voters towards 
the ideologically similar party. For example, I would expect traditionalism to correlate with 
Republican identification. However, for beliefs that do not as easily align themselves with one 
party platform, I would expect a correlation between orthodoxy and legalism in faith and 
conservatism in politics.  
While more of a control than an actual experimental variable, I would expect political 
attitudes to be strong predictors of party identification. Because of ideological sorting among 
parties, Republicans and Democrats are likely going to hold mostly consistent views among 
themselves.  
Finally, I hypothesize that race and other demographics will be a reasonably accurate 
predictor of party identification. While White Catholics will likely be more divided, I expect to 
find a sizeable majority of Latino Catholics identifying as Democrats or Democratic-leaning 
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independents. Similarly, I predict that Republican identification will correlate positively with 
income and age, and identification as male. All of these variables are fairly well documented as 
showing correlation, so a deviant result here would be quite unexpected. What may be of more 
interest is whether there any factors that predict variation within larger demographical categories.  
Data and Evaluation of Hypotheses 
Consistent with the findings of Greer and Ryan and Milazzo, the macropartisan behavior 
of Catholics appears to match the general population almost exactly.114 Catholics are split 37.5 
percent Republican/Lean Republican, 43.8 percent Democratic/Lean Democratic, and 18.8 
percent No Lean/Other, while national percentages are 37.2 percent, 44.4 percent, and 18.4 
percent, respectively. Looking solely at party identification, it appears that identification with 
Catholicism has little large-scale impact. While Catholics are slightly more likely to identify as 
Democrats than Republicans, the American population as a whole is also more likely to identify 
in this way.  
Religiosity and Religious Behavior 
I hypothesized that religiosity and religious behavior would be more closely associated with 
Republican identification and the data supports my hypothesis to a degree. However, out of all 
the measures of religious behavior, the only one with any real degree of significance is the 
measure of church attendance (see table 1). Catholics who attend religious services more than 
once a week are far more likely to be Republican. From here, the probability of Democratic 
 
114 Greer, "Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party."; Ryan and Milazzo, "The South, the Suburbs, and 
the Vatican Too: Explaining Partisan Change Among Catholics." 
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identification increases moderately with decreased attendance until it peaks at attendance of “a 
few times a year”—likely “Christmas and Easter” Catholics. The last few levels of attendance  
lean still lean more Democratic than the overall distribution of Catholics. This result is consistent 
with previous research using this metric, showing a direct relationship between church 
attendance and Republican identification. 
 
Table 1 
Religiosity and Religious Behavior 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Importance of Religion     5.543 4 .236   
- Somewhat important -.072 .068 1.115 1 .291 .931 
- Not too important -.126 .118 1.137 1 .286 .881 
- Not at all important .217 .210 1.066 1 .302 1.242 
Church Attendance     29.942 6 .000   
- Once a week .310 .102 9.289 1 .002 1.364 
- Once or twice a month .472 .114 17.160 1 .000 1.603 
- A few times a year .602 .116 26.995 1 .000 1.826 
- Seldom .451 .125 12.923 1 .000 1.569 
- Never .381 .156 5.999 1 .014 1.464 
Frequency of Prayer     14.517 7 .043   
- Once a day .195 .072 7.430 1 .006 1.215 
- A few times a week .068 .085 .634 1 .426 1.070 
- Once a week .290 .143 4.092 1 .043 1.336 
- A few times a month -.053 .120 .196 1 .658 .948 
- Seldom .231 .112 4.284 1 .038 1.260 
- Never .101 .183 .308 1 .579 1.107 
Frequency of Scripture Reading     5.562 5 .351   
- Once or twice a month -.141 .096 2.182 1 .140 .868 
- Several times a year -.194 .100 3.756 1 .053 .824 
- Seldom -.115 .085 1.839 1 .175 .892 
- Never -.141 .085 2.760 1 .097 .868 
Constant -.210 .091 5.338 1 .021 .811 
Comparison of categorical variables based on highest frequencies/ratings, explaining their absence from this table. 
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In contrast, religiosity offers little insight. Survey participants who responded that 
religion is “very important” in their lives—nearly two-thirds of Catholics—are split by party 
almost exactly the same as Catholics as a whole. No levels of religiosity are statistically 
significant in determining party identification.  
Frequency of prayer also is rather helpful. Most Catholics pray relatively frequently, with 
most at least once a day. Interestingly, those who pray more than once a day are very likely to 
identify as Republicans, but those who pray only once a day are significantly more likely to 
identify as Democrats. Other than at these frequencies, results are only significant at “once a 
week,” which skews Democratic, and at “a few times a month,” which skews Republican. This 
variance in behavior and variance in significance make it difficult to see any meaningful 
correlation.  
Frequency of scripture reading yields no significant results and no substantive 
conclusions can be drawn from this metric of religious behavior.  
My hypothesis appears to be supported, but to a lesser degree than I had anticipated. Only 
one measure skewed significantly toward Republican identification.  
Religious Belief 
Religious Attitudes 
In general, it appears that departure from orthodoxy is slightly linked with Democratic 
identification, while less can be said for those that maintain orthodoxy. When looking for 
guidance on right and wrong, the majority of Catholics look primarily to religious teaching or 
common sense, though neither response carries any significant influence on party identification. 
Among the 10 percent of Catholics who responded with “scientific information,” Democrats 
more than doubled Republicans, and probability of identification skewed moderately Democratic 
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at a significance of less than 0.1 (see table 2). While these results cannot accurately predict 
Republican identification, trust in science for guidance on morality seems to be a reasonably 
successful predictor of Democratic partisanship.  
Certainty of belief in God does not have any statistically significant results, but any 
response than less than “fairly certain” appears to skew Democratic simply by frequency, while 
absolute certainty leans slightly Republican.  
Regarding belief in Heaven and Hell, Republicans are overrepresented among those with 
orthodox beliefs. Surprisingly, only about two-thirds of Catholics in total believe in Heaven and 
Hell, but this group is split evenly between Democrats and Republicans. Orthodox belief slightly 
increases the likelihood of Republican identification at a significance of 0.1. Other responses 
offer no meaningful levels of significance.  
Belief in the Bible as the word of God presents an interesting set of statistically 
significant results. While a majority of Catholics believe that the Bible is in some form the word 
of God, more Democrats than Republicans believe that the Bible ought to be taken literally, word 
for word. This result is likely linked to the black Evangelical churches, who hold to biblical 
literalism. Accordingly, a small majority of people who think that the Bible is the word of God 
but not everything should be taken literally are Republicans. Though not significant, a majority 
of Catholics who believe that the Bible is not the word of God identify as Democrats. While 
these findings at first glance appear to be a slight hiccup in my orthodoxy hypothesis, the 
Catholic tradition recognizes that there are different genres of writing in the Bible and that not 
everything is to be interpreted literally, meaning that Republicans do largely fall under Catholic 
belief.  
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Table 2 
Religious Belief/Attitudes 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Guidance on morality     14.858 4 .005   
- Religious teaching .119 .198 .360 1 .549 1.126 
- Philosophy .020 .212 .009 1 .926 1.020 
- Common sense .030 .195 .023 1 .879 1.030 
- Science .409 .214 3.644 1 .056 1.506 
Certainty of belief in God     9.137 4 .058   
- Absolutely certain -.192 .272 .496 1 .481 .825 
- Fairly certain -.105 .276 .145 1 .703 .900 
- Not too certain .276 .314 .776 1 .378 1.318 
- Not at all certain .026 .391 .004 1 .947 1.026 
Belief in Heaven and Hell     20.016 3 .000   
- Belief in Both -.166 .100 2.734 1 .098 .847 
- Belief in Heaven and not Hell .099 .108 .846 1 .358 1.104 
- Belief in Hell and not Heaven .432 .261 2.736 1 .098 1.541 
Bible as the Word of God     46.199 4 .000   
- Bible is the literal word of God .253 .121 4.359 1 .037 1.288 
- Word of God, not everything literal -.231 .115 4.050 1 .044 .794 
- Word of God, other .250 .210 1.414 1 .234 1.284 
- Not the word of God -.035 .119 .085 1 .771 .966 
Evolution     22.584 4 .000   
- Evolution by natural processes .493 .160 9.469 1 .002 1.637 
- Evolution guided by God .188 .158 1.427 1 .232 1.207 
- Evolution, don't know/refused .198 .203 .946 1 .331 1.219 
- No evolution .242 .158 2.363 1 .124 1.274 
Traditionalism     77.560 4 .000   
- Church should preserve beliefs -.736 .168 19.265 1 .000 .479 
- Church should adjust beliefs -.342 .167 4.160 1 .041 .711 
- Church should adopt modern beliefs -.060 .176 .118 1 .731 .941 
- Other -.028 .381 .006 1 .940 .972 
Church focuses too much on rules     53.049 2 .000   
- Agree .165 .162 1.042 1 .307 1.179 
- Disagree -.284 .161 3.103 1 .078 .753 
Church too concerned with power     .180 2 .914   
- Agree -.019 .167 .013 1 .909 .981 
- Disagree -.043 .166 .068 1 .794 .958 
Church too involved with politics     32.515 2 .000   
- Agree .089 .159 .315 1 .575 1.093 
- Disagree -.265 .156 2.871 1 .090 .767 
Constant .644 .393 2.688 1 .101 1.904 
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Belief in human evolution is less surprising. A significant majority of Catholics agree 
with evolution in some form. As expected, Catholics who believe that humans evolved due 
solely to natural processes are slightly more likely to identify as Democrats. Neither belief in 
guided evolution nor strict creationism demonstrate any significant correlation, but frequencies 
skew slightly Republican and slightly Democratic, respectively. After further examination, this 
belief also appears to be linked with lower levels of education. 
Religious attitudes as a whole appear to have little significant effect on partisan 
identification, and in the cases where they do, effect is small and predictable. The only exception 
this rule was biblical literalism, which to my surprise was linked to Democratic affiliation. 
Additionally, links to Democratic identification were more visible than correlation with 
Republican ID, always in departure from Catholic orthodoxy. These results are consistent with 
my hypothesis.  
Attitudes about Religion 
The second subcategory of variables under religious belief includes attitudes towards 
religion, and specifically the institutional church. The first of these is traditionalism in the 
Church. A strong correlation exists between the notion that the Church should maintain 
traditional beliefs and practices and Republican identification, manifesting in an equally strong 
effect. While a large percentage of those who want the Church to “preserve its traditional beliefs 
and practices” are Republicans, there is still a sizeable percentage of Democrats who would 
rather the Church hang on to its tradition. Unsurprisingly, a majority of those who want the 
Church to “adopt modern beliefs and practices” are Democrats, but this relationship shows no 
statistical significance.  
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 Several measures link trust in institutional religion with Republican identification. A 
majority of Catholics who believe that churches focus too much on rules identify as Democrats, 
while a sizeable plurality who disagree with this premise identify as Republicans. The latter 
relationship is significant at 0.078, while the former is not significant. While there is no 
significant relationship among those who agree that the Church is too involved in politics, there 
is a significant correlation between Republican identification and disagreement with this 
statement. Given that more recent studies shows Pope Francis to have a substantially lower 
approval rating among Republicans,115 this relationship may have changed over the four years 
between studies. No significant relationship is present among views about churches and money 
and power. 
Political Attitudes 
On the whole, political attitudes are often quite predictive of party identification, and 
particularly among Republicans. The first of these attitudes, thoughts on abortion legality, fits 
expectations in some ways but not in others. Among those who believe that abortion should be 
legal in all cases, Democrats more than double Republicans, but there does not appear to be any 
statistical significance. On the other hand, there appears to be a strong correlation between the 
belief that abortion should be illegal and Republican identification (see table 3). Despite this, 
among those who believe abortion should be illegal in all cases, Democrats still account for a 
third of respondents in this category. While the abortion issue does appear to be a predictor of 
party identification, it is not as clear-cut as one might expect.  
  
 
115 Pew Research Center, Confidence in Pope Francis Down Sharply in U.S. (2018). 
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Table 3 
Political Attitudes 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Legality of Abortion     98.225 4 .000   
- Legal in all cases .163 .176 .856 1 .355 1.177 
- Legal in most cases .030 .166 .033 1 .856 1.030 
- Illegal in most cases -.558 .166 11.284 1 .001 .572 
- Illegal in all cases -.577 .173 11.167 1 .001 .562 
Legality of Same-Sex 
Marriage 
    24.379 4 .000   
- Strongly Favor .089 .135 .433 1 .510 1.093 
- Favor -.132 .125 1.121 1 .290 .876 
- Oppose -.263 .130 4.071 1 .044 .769 
- Strongly Oppose -.423 .143 8.717 1 .003 .655 
Government Aid to the Poor     269.311 3 .000   
- More harm than good -.240 .244 .967 1 .325 .786 
- More good than harm .808 .245 10.874 1 .001 2.244 
- Neither/Both equally .689 .292 5.568 1 .018 1.991 
Size of government     443.886 3 .000   
- Smaller govt., fewer services -1.526 .210 52.699 1 .000 .217 
- Bigger govt., more services -.206 .211 .952 1 .329 .814 
- Depends -.210 .290 .527 1 .468 .810 
Environmental Laws     141.006 3 .000   
- Strict laws are harmful -.635 .200 10.081 1 .001 .530 
- Strict laws are worth the cost .128 .199 .410 1 .522 1.136 
- Neither/Both equally -.243 .304 .639 1 .424 .784 
Constant 1.331 .336 15.731 1 .000 3.786 
 
Other political attitudes are fairly straightforward. Though a modest majority of Catholics 
are in favor of marriage equality, responses are significantly divided by party. A solid majority 
of those who favor marriage equality are Democrats, while most of those who oppose it are 
Republicans. Again, the former relationship is insignificant, while the latter is quite significant. 
Opposition to marriage equality, then, is a solid predictor of Republican identification. 
Government aid to the poor is also point of separation among parties. Party identifiers 
largely gravitate towards the position on this issue most closely held by their party. Out of those 
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who believe government aid does more harm than good, a statistically significant majority 
identify as Republican. Democrats outnumber Republicans in for the opposite response, but this 
relationship lacks significance. A similar result is seen regarding opinion on the scope of 
government. Belief in small government is a very strong predictor of Republican identification.  
Environmental laws and regulations also predict party identification. Among those who 
believe that strict regulations are harmful, Republicans nearly double Democrats, showing a 
moderately large effect and a high degree of significance. No significant relationship is visible in 
other responses. 
It appears that political attitudes are a far more consistent and accurate predictor of 
partisan identification than either religious practice or belief, at least for minority (typically 
conservative) opinions. The data supports initial hypotheses and is consistent with previous 
research.  
Demographics 
As predicted, some demographic categories are quite predictive of party identification. 
Males are moderately more likely than females to identify as Republican at a high degree of 
significance (see table 4). Identification with a minority race or ethnicity has an extremely high 
impact on party identification. While a small sample size in this survey, Black non-Hispanic 
Catholics predictably are overwhelmingly likely to identify as Democratic; regression finds this 
large effect highly significant. Hispanic Catholics also lean significantly Democratic. In contrast, 
white non-Hispanic Catholics lean slightly Republican by frequency, but there is no significance 
to this relationship.  
Income also appears to have a reasonable effect on party identification. In 2013 dollars, 
those who have a family income of $40,000 or less are disproportionately Democratic, while 
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those making more than $40,000 are disproportionately Republican. Values for under $40,000 
are significant, while those between $40,000 and $150,000 show no significance. Those earning 
$150,000 yearly significantly skew Republican.  
Table 4 
Demographics 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Sex - Male -.327 .057 33.118 1 .000 .721 
Race-Ethnicity     298.039 4 .000   
- White non-Hispanic -.048 .275 .030 1 .862 .953 
- Black non-Hispanic 2.392 .374 40.891 1 .000 10.938 
- Hispanic 1.070 .280 14.568 1 .000 2.917 
- Other .696 .300 5.396 1 .020 2.006 
Age Range     49.035 15 .000   
- 24 or younger .100 .277 .130 1 .719 1.105 
- 25-29 .325 .286 1.293 1 .255 1.384 
- 30-34 .339 .283 1.435 1 .231 1.403 
- 35-39 .430 .280 2.353 1 .125 1.537 
- 40-44 .441 .276 2.550 1 .110 1.554 
- 45-49 .390 .271 2.068 1 .150 1.477 
- 50-54 .472 .271 3.039 1 .081 1.603 
- 55-59 .725 .271 7.148 1 .008 2.065 
- 60-64 .780 .273 8.163 1 .004 2.182 
- 65-69 .805 .278 8.378 1 .004 2.236 
- 70-74 .660 .282 5.454 1 .020 1.934 
- 75-79 .368 .294 1.572 1 .210 1.445 
- 80-84 .798 .303 6.964 1 .008 2.222 
- 85-89 .860 .335 6.585 1 .010 2.363 
- 90 or older .779 .397 3.859 1 .049 2.180 
Education     19.124 8 .014   
- Less than high school -.174 .557 .098 1 .754 .840 
- High school incomplete .130 .558 .054 1 .816 1.139 
- High school graduate -.128 .545 .055 1 .814 .880 
- Some college, no degree -.130 .547 .056 1 .813 .879 
- Two-year associate degree -.117 .550 .045 1 .832 .890 
- Four-year college degree -.282 .548 .264 1 .607 .754 
- Postgrad, no degree .294 .592 .247 1 .619 1.342 
- Postgrad or professional .088 .551 .026 1 .873 1.092 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Income     33.651 9 .000   
- Less than $10,000 .324 .138 5.509 1 .019 1.383 
- 10 to under $20,000 .379 .121 9.894 1 .002 1.461 
- 20 to under $30,000 .278 .120 5.403 1 .020 1.321 
- 30 to under $40,000 .208 .123 2.860 1 .091 1.231 
- 40 to under $50,000 -.022 .127 .030 1 .863 .978 
- 50 to under $75,000 .015 .112 .017 1 .897 1.015 
- 75 to under $100,000 .188 .117 2.577 1 .108 1.207 
- 100 to under $150,000 -.052 .123 .180 1 .671 .949 
- $150,000 or more -.259 .132 3.863 1 .049 .771 
Constant .403 .798 .255 1 .614 1.496 
Other variables are less telling. In looking at frequency breakdown by education, one 
would expect education to be a predictor of identification. Democrats are overrepresented among 
those with education less than a college degree, while Republicans are overrepresented among 
those with higher levels of education. In particular, there is a huge spike of Republican 
identification among those with four-year degree—nearly 50 percent of all respondents at this 
level. Surprisingly, none of these values show any meaningful degree of statistical significance.   
Age was also much less of a predictor than I had anticipated, but where it was, the results 
were unexpected. Only half of the age ranges offered any significance, all of them above age 55, 
but surprisingly they all skewed Democratic. This result makes sense if older Democratic 
identifiers are remnants of a reliably Democratic bloc.  
Where these results are significant, they support my hypothesis. Race and income are 
often excellent predictors of identification and age is occasionally significant, though education 
surprisingly displays no significance in my model.  
Conclusions and Areas for Future Research 
After reviewing the data, none of my four hypotheses can be rejected entirely, as each 
category of variables included at least one with a noticeable and statistically significant effect. 
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Mass attendance seems to be linked with Republican identification, consistent with previous 
literature, while other measures in this category provide no meaningful results. Likewise, 
traditionalism and departure from Catholic orthodoxy (surprisingly including biblical literalism) 
are generally predictive of Republican and Democratic identification, respectively. However, as 
predicted, neither category of religious variables had as large or consistent impact on party 
identification as political values or demographics, especially race and ethnicity. Both of these 
categories were often very predictive of party identification, consistent with my hypotheses.  
This study presents several avenues for further research. Most obvious is that this data 
used in this study was collected five years previous to the time of writing. Replication of this 
study with the next iteration of the Religious Landscape Study could help to further support these 
results or to offer additional insight into patterns and trends in American Catholicism. A second 
area for development is a dive into regional influence. The rural/urban divide in America may 
also have effects within Catholicism. Third, my study found the effects of education on party 
affiliation to be statistically insignificant, despite visible disparities in party split at each level of 
education. A follow-up study may either support this insignificance or challenge it.  
Moving outside the methodology used here, case studies of individual Catholics or 
parishes and their own practice of Catholicism may also provide valuable insight. First-hand, 
personal accounts of political socialization and the challenges faced by faithful Catholics in 
selecting between imperfect candidates and imperfect platforms would complement the cross-
sectional approach taken by this study.  
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Final Thoughts 
In the practice of democracy, people bring to the ballot box the sum of their own 
experiences—their hopes, dreams, worries, and fears. For the faithful Catholic, Church teaching 
should be a strong consideration in the electoral process, both as a motivator for participation and 
as a determiner of values. The above study demonstrates some relation between religious belief 
and practice and corresponding party identification, but it also shows the breadth of opinions 
held by people all claiming the same faith. The human person through reason and revelation has 
access to the truth of God, but in going beyond what is known in this way in the creation of what 
we think of as law, there is certainly room for legitimate disagreement in policy preference upon 
the foundation of Church teaching.  
In order that the American public could work through these disagreements in search of 
the common good, the Framers envisioned a democratic republic, governed by the people on 
behalf of the people. At the present, this vision is in jeopardy as American democracy (and 
democracy around the world) seems to be pulling itself apart by the seams. Human tendency to 
division and isolation has become the dominant force in mainstream culture and political 
institutions. Polarization in the last few decades especially has left Americans on both sides of 
the divide angry and hurt. A system in which only two political parties can legitimately be 
electorally viable naturally tends toward division as ours has. Even internally among American 
Catholics, there seem to be two main camps—those focused respectively on personal morality 
and piety and those focused on social justice—in which politics often seem to drive theology, 
and not the other way around. The former tends to forget their relationship with their neighbor, 
while the latter tends to forget their relationship with God and with themselves.  
In response, now more than ever, I think the America is in desperate need of a truly and 
wholly Catholic practice of faith in the public sphere—one that refrains from turning faith into 
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merely ideology. Reinhold Niebuhr writes in Moral Man and Immoral Society that while the 
love that religion espouses can be a force for good, religion cannot be an agent of dramatic social 
change because it tends toward body-spirit dualism and a focus on God to the exclusion of 
neighbor and community, as well as a defeatism regarding the moral character of the world as is 
espoused in Augustine’s City of God.116 There is no doubt that Niebuhr’s statements certainly 
reflect the actions of many Christians today, but if there were any faith that could be an 
exception to his rule it would be Catholicism, which insists that all morality is social and 
professes a belief in the unity and dignity of the human person, body and soul. For the Catholic, 
though relationship with God may be considered prior to relationship with humanity, 
relationship with God cannot exist apart from relationship with humanity. Though Catholics 
may conscientiously disagree about which political party best represents the faith of the Church, 
or how best to implement these views through public policy, all of us are called to the same, 
unconditional love of neighbor. Though it may not erase all injustice, if we can love God and one 
another in the model of Christ, maybe—just maybe—we can catch a glimpse of the kingdom of 
God on earth.  
  
 
116 Niebuhr, Reinhold Niebuhr: Major Works on Religion and Politics.; 
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